From the public anthology

Montesquieu · De l'esprit des lois · De l'esprit des lois, Préface and Book I, chapters 1-2

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“The laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations derived from the nature of things; and, in this sense, all beings have their laws: the Divinity has its laws, the material world has its laws, the intelligences superior to man have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man has his laws.”

I would first ask men to examine the prejudices of their birth and country. I would first ask them to divest themselves of all their prejudices, and to consider the laws of nature as they are in themselves. I have not drawn my principles from my prejudices, but from the nature of things. I have considered the laws in their relations with the different beings, and I have examined the relations between the laws and the different constitutions of governments. I have begun by examining the laws in their relation to the different beings. The laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations derived from the nature of things; and, in this sense, all beings have their laws: the Divinity has its laws, the material world has its laws, the intelligences superior to man have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man has his laws. Those who have said that a blind fatality has produced all the effects that we see in the world have advanced a great absurdity; for what greater absurdity is there than a blind fatality that has produced intelligent beings? There is, then, a primitive reason; and laws are the relations that exist between it and the different beings, and the relations of these different beings among themselves. God is related to the universe as creator and preserver; the laws by which he created are those by which he preserves; he acts according to these rules because he knows them; he knows them because he made them; he made them because they are related to his wisdom and power. Since we see that the world, although formed by the motion of matter and devoid of intelligence, always subsists, its motions must have invariable laws; and if one could imagine another world, it would have constant rules, or it would be destroyed. Thus creation, which appears to be an arbitrary act, presupposes rules as invariable as the fatality of the atheists. It is absurd to say that the creator could govern the world without these rules, since the world would not subsist without them. These rules are a constant relation. Between one moving body and another moving body, it is according to the relations of mass and velocity that all motions are received, increased, diminished, lost; each diversity is uniformity, each change is constancy. Particular intelligent beings have their own laws; but they do not always follow them. The beasts, which are deprived of intelligence, have their own laws; but they do not always follow them. Man, as a physical being, is governed by invariable laws; as an intelligent being, he constantly violates the laws that God has established, and changes those that he himself establishes; he must guide himself, and yet he is a limited being; he is subject to ignorance and error, as well as to a thousand passions; such a being could at any moment forget his creator; God has called him back to him by the laws of religion; such a being could at any moment forget himself; philosophers have reminded him of himself by the laws of morality; made to live in society, he could forget his fellow men; legislators have restored him to his duties by political and civil laws. Before all positive laws, there are laws of nature. The name 'law of nature' is given to those that derive solely from the constitution of our being. To know them well, one must consider man before the establishment of societies. The laws of nature are those that he would receive in such a state. The law that impresses on us the idea of a creator, and leads us to him, is the first of the natural laws by its importance, though not by its order in time. Man in the state of nature would have the faculty of knowing rather than knowledge. It is clear that his first ideas would not be speculative; he would think of the preservation of his being before seeking the origin of his being. Such a man would at first feel only his weakness; his timidity would be extreme; and if there were any need of proof of this, savages have been found in forests; everything makes them tremble, everything makes them flee. In this state, each feels himself inferior; he scarcely feels equality. He would not seek to attack, and peace would be the first natural law. Hobbes gives men the desire to subdue one another, but this is not reasonable. The idea of empire and domination is so complex and depends on so many other ideas that it would not be the first that man would have. Hobbes asks why, if men are not naturally in a state of war, they always go armed and have keys to lock their doors. But this is not felt until after the establishment of societies, which have brought about the state of war among men.