And finally, since I sought no other occupation than to devote myself to the cultivation of my reason, and since I could not have chosen a path better suited to that end, I was quite content with the plan I had made for my life. I had, however, before taking up this course, prepared for myself a provisional morality, consisting only of three or four maxims, which I should like to make known to you.

The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, holding firmly to the religion in which God had granted me the grace to be instructed from my childhood, and guiding myself, in all other matters, by the most moderate opinions, those furthest from excess, that were commonly practiced in the society where I should live. And although I might perhaps perceive as much likelihood in the opinions of one as of another, I saw nevertheless that the most moderate, besides always being the safest to follow and the most probable, are also always the least burdensome to those who embrace them, and consequently the most excusable if one ever abandons them, since it rarely happens that anyone regrets having chosen the best rather than merely the good. And above all, I placed among excesses the excess of all those who wish to be wiser than is necessary, by not daring to believe in all things what it is useful to believe.

My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I could be, and to follow no less constantly the most doubtful opinions, once I had resolved upon them, than if they had been most certain, imitating in this the example of travellers who, finding themselves lost in some forest, must not wander about turning this way and that, nor remain always in one place, but must walk always as straight as they can in one direction, and not change it for slight reasons, even though perhaps at the beginning it was only chance alone that determined their choice, and although the reasons they might have had for it were of very slight likelihood. And by this means, if they do not go exactly where they wish, at least they will arrive somewhere in the end, where presumably they will be better off than in the middle of a forest. And thus, since our actions cannot be so often examined and regulated by the principles of reason as our opinions, insensibly carried away by example and custom, those who conduct themselves by the path of reason will always act more reasonably, and one may follow one's doubtful opinion as assuredly as if it were certain.

My third maxim was to try always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world, and generally to accustom myself to believe that there is nothing entirely within our power except our thoughts, insinuating after this that we elevate ourselves as long as we have no passion, but that it does not also depend on us to have no passions in the soul, because fortune presents us with desires, and we must yield before fortune and before the world rather than wish to conquer them, so that fortune changes our fortunes and the world the order of the world; but that our thoughts being all within our power, we govern them. For this seemed to me sufficient to teach me the pains and the proud blessings that the wise receive from the goods and evils of fortune, for of ourselves, we desire only what we possess, and the sweetness of our desires lies in desiring nothing other than what can come from ourselves, just as one may cut oneself with a sword, but cannot cut oneself with thoughts.

And finally, to conclude this provisional morality, I always had great doubt whether the fortune and power of men were more capable of producing good effects than their thoughts, although I saw that those most devoted to philosophy are always the most at ease, for philosophy, besides instructing the mind in all that can be taught it, also consoles us, by teaching us that we must never expect anything except from ourselves, for one can do without everything, thought alone excepted.